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The extensive failures revealed by the global inancial crisis have brought the reform of 
the existing inancial regulatory architecture near to the top of the public policy agenda in 
Europe, the US, as well as international bodies such as the G20. Regulatory agencies in most 
industrialized economies have frequently been accused of having fallen ‘asleep at the wheel’ 
in the years before the crisis, and their conduct has received renewed scrutiny. However, most 
debates concerning the regulatory response to the crisis frequently neglect a key point: the 
regulation of inancial markets is more than what regulators do.
This insight is central to the volume written by Geoffrey P Miller and Fabrizio Cafaggi, 
together with Tiago Andreotti, Maciej Borowicz, Agnieszka Janczuk, Eugenia Macchiavello, 
and Paolo Saguato. The volume is part of a broader collaborative work investigating the mix of 
public and private regulation and enforcement. Among the different domains and industries, 
inance stands out for the extent, variety, and relevance of governance arrangements designed 
and administered by the same inancial industry. The volume makes an important contribution 
to the studies of inancial regulation by systematically reviewing and analyzing the diversity 
of these private regulation and enforcement mechanisms. 
Indeed, private regulatory mechanisms are to be found at a multitude of levels, starting 
from inside individual inancial irms where internal compliance oficers, internal auditors, 
and risk management oficers perform functions that are key to the orderly functioning of 
inancial markets. Financial industry associations gathering the key stakeholders active in 
a given domain also play key regulatory functions in governing some of the newest and 
most rapidly developing areas of inancial markets, such as microinance and derivatives, as 
well as in one of the most traditional areas—that is, the payment system and international 
accounting standards.  Indeed, as the analysis of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Associations (a private standard-setting body composed of the major participants in the 
market, for regulating credit derivatives contracts) highlights, the regulatory impact of 
inancial industry associations is often not limited to the national sphere but also ills gaps in 
international regulatory architecture. 
These private governance arrangements, however, rarely remain completely outside of 
the sphere of inluence of government. For example, the volume emphasizes how banking 
regulatory authorities that comprise the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have come 
to incorporate a greater role for private regulatory mechanisms in international banking 
standards. The cornerstone of the international banking regulation, the Basel Agreement, relies 
heavily on internal modeling, processes, and risk assessments by the inancial institutions 
that they are designed to regulate. More broadly, the domains analyzed in this book reveal a 
wide range of variations in the division of responsibilities between public and private actors 
in the process of standard setting and enforcement.  
What is, then, the proper allocation of regulatory authority between public and private 
actors? The authors take upon themselves the task of assessing the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different private governance arrangements, including their legitimacy 
2 Stefano Pagliari
and accountability. According to the authors, an extension in the reliance on government 
intervention is not always the most desirable approach. While acknowledging some of the 
limitations associated with private regulations—in particular, the misalignment between the 
incentives of private actors and those of the public—the authors highlight how private actors 
can be enlisted to carry out some of the tasks traditionally assigned to governments. 
This conclusion partially clashes with the direction of most regulatory initiatives 
introduced in response to the global inancial crisis. As a number of inancial scandals such 
as Libor have revealed severe shortcomings in the accountability and effectiveness of private 
governance arrangements, policy makers have in recent years expanded the perimeter of 
public regulation to encompass a number of sectors previously self-regulated. The authors 
argue that the crisis has not displaced the involvement of private actors in the regulation 
of inance. On the contrary, new forms of interaction between expanded public regulatory 
frameworks and private transnational actors are emerging, as private industry associations 
introduce changes in their internal structures in order to enhance their accountability 
relationships and increase the legitimacy. However, the publication of this volume, as the 
regulatory response to the crisis is still unfolding, limits the capacity to assess whether the 
multitude of private governance arrangements analyzed in this volume will remain structural 
feature of the governance of inance in the 21st century or a trend in decline. 
Indeed, a longer historical view would reveal how the border between the public and 
private spheres in the governance of inance has changed signiicantly over the decades, with 
the peak of private governance in inance arguably preceding the rise of the involvement of 
the state in the regulation of markets after the Great Depression. If history is any lesson, the 
move away from private governance arrangements in the current phase is a cyclical rather 
than structural characteristic of the regulation of inance. As the memories of the crisis fade, 
public authorities are likely to increasingly resort to solutions designed by the inancial 
industry in the future. This volume therefore provides a helpful guide to understanding the 
strengths and limitations of what has remained a key component of the regulation of inancial 
markets not only before the crisis but also in the coming years.
